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PERPETUAL DISSENTS
Allison Orr Larsen·

INTRODUCTION

"I adhere to my belief that the death penalty is in all circumstances
cruel and unusual punishment."' "I continue to believe that campaign finance laws are subject to strict scrutiny."2 "I am not yet ready to adhere to .
. . Seminole Tribe. " 3 Statements of this sort-made by dissenters who cling
to their losing views in subsequent cases-are familiar to readers of recent
Supreme Court opinions. Strangely, however, the practice of "perpetual
dissent" has received little attention from the legal academy. Though much
has been written on the value of dissent generally4 and on the Court's allegiance (or lack thereof) to the rule of stare decisis, 5 few have stopped to
ponder the practice of continually repeating resistance to a decision even
years after the decision has become law. 6

• Attorney, O'Melveny & Myers, LLP. Law Clerk to the Hon. David H. Souter, U.S. Supreme
Court, 2005-06. Law Clerk to the Hon. J. Harvie Wilkinson, Ill, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, 2004-05. J.D., University of Virginia Law School, 2004. The author wishes to thank Caleb
Nelson, Risa Goluboff, Lillian BeVier, Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson lll, G. Edward White, John Jeffries,
Leslie Kendrick, Meaghan McLaine, Jon Kravis, Jon Michaels, and Drew Larsen for their assistance
with this project. The views expressed herein are solely those of the author.
1 Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 324 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
2 Fed. Election Cornm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 164 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
3 Coli. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 699 (1999)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
4 See. e.g., PERCIVAL E. JACKSON, DISSENT IN THE SUPREME COURT: A CHRONOLOGY 4 (1969).
See generally CASS SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 176-82 (2003); William J. Brennan, Jr.,
In Defense ofDissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427 (1986); Richard Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial
Dissent, 48 DUKE L.J. 243 (1998).
5 See, e.g., William S. Consovoy, The Rehnquist Court and the End of Constitutional Stare Decisis: Casey. Dickerson. and the Consequences of Pragmatic Adjudication, 2002 UTAH L. REv. 53
(2002); Deborah Hellman, The Importance of Appearing Principled, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 1107 (1995);
Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to the Rehnquist
Court, 52 VAND. L. REV. 647 (1999).
6 Twenty years ago, Maurice Kelman wrote an essay on the subject entitled The Forked Path of
Dissent, 1985 SuP. CT. REv. 227 (1985). Since then, very little has been said about the practice of perpetual dissents, although several scholars have referred to it within specific contexts. See, e.g., Ronald J.
Krotoszynski, Jr., An Epitaphios for Neutral Principles in Constitutional Law: Bush v. Gore and the
Emerging Jurisprudence of Oprah!, 90 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2108-14 (2002); Michael Mello, Adhering to
Our Views: Justices Brennan and Marshall and the Relentless Dissent to Death as a Punishment, 22
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 591 (1995); Neil Siegel, State Sovereign Immunity and Stare Decisis: Solving the
Prisoners' Dilemma Within the Court, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1165 (2001).
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And yet the practice should give us pause. On the one hand, history
has glorified many great dissenters on the Supreme Court (Justice Holmes
in Lochner, Justice Harlan in Plessy) whose views were eventually redeemed and whose words seem all the wiser in the present when echoed
from the past. 7 It is understandable, then, why an individual Justice would
feel the need to continue resisting a decision that she thinks is wrong; perhaps repetition is a key part of the dissenter's ultimate dream of vindication.
On the other hand, opting to repeat a dissent because of continued distaste for a controlling precedent-regardless of the reason for the distasteis difficult to reconcile with the deeply-rooted American principle that a
court ordinarily must follow its previous decisions to preserve its public
legitimacy. As Justice Powell has explained, "restraint in decisionmaking
and respect for decisions once made are the keys to preservation of an independent judiciary and public respect for the judiciary's role as a guardian of
rights." 8 The rule of "stare decisis," shorthand for the Latin maxim meaning
"stand by the thing decided and do not disturb the calm," 9 is a bedrock principle of American jurisprudence. Many people, including several Justices
themselves, believe that this commitment to precedent underlies the Court's
legitimacy, and it is only from this legitimacy that the Court derives its
power. 10
Different Justices hold different views on stare decisis, and possess
varying degrees of commitment to the principle. This Essay does not purport to validate one view or challenge another. It does not take on the general problem of stare decisis, questioning when a Justice should vote to
overrule a precedent. Instead, it asks a different question: If a Justice is
committed to stare decisis-in whatever degree-should he be more willing
to overrule precedents from which he dissented originally?
Justices seem to be answering yes, at least in modem times. A review
of the dissents on the Rehnquist Court reveals that the perpetual dissent is
7 Richa~d Primus has suggested that some dissents become authoritative precedents without
actually being adopted by a majority of the Court. This happens, he suggests, when redeeming courts
make the dissents canonical authority. Primus, supra note 4, at 245-48.
8 Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 281, 288
( 1990); see also Daniel A. Farber, The Rule of Law and the Law ofPrecedents, 90 MINN. L. REv. 1173
(2005); Kevin M. Stack, The Practice ofDissent in the Supreme Court, 105 YALE L.J. 2235 (1996).
9 John Wallace, Stare Decisis and the Rehnquist Court: The Collision ofActivism, Passivism and
Politics in Casey, 42 BUFF. L. REV. 187, 189 (1994) ("The term stare decisis is an abbreviated form of
the Latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta moevre ....");see also W. M . Lite, Some Views on the Rule
ofStare Decisis, 4 VA. L. REv. 95 (1916).
10 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood ofSe. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,865-69 (1992); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827-28 (1991) ("Stare decisis is the preferred course because it promotes the
evenhanded predictable and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial
decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process."); Vasquez v.
Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986) ("[Stare decisis] permits society to presume that bedrock principles
are founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals, and thereby contributes to the integrity of our constitutional system of government both in appearance and in fact.").
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more the norm these days, rather than the exception. Perpetual dissents are
not confined to Justices of any particular ideology and are certainly not
confined to any particular subject matter. Indeed, as this Essay will reveal,
every single member of the Rehnquist Court has stuck with a dissenting
view in a subsequent case at least once, and the object of these perpetual
dissents ranges from abortion 11 to state sovereign immunity 12 to the Federal
Arbitration Act. 13
With a practice this rampant, several questions come to mind: When
should a Justice continue to fight what he considers to be a wrong decision,
and when should he acquiesce? Do perpetual dissents ever have value or do
they represent simple judicial stubbornness? If perpetual dissents increase
in frequency over time, what will the consequences be for the Court as an
institution, for the doctrine of stare decisis, and for the Justices themselves?
This Essay seeks to ignite the conversation by tackling these questions
and raising others. Part I discusses the prevalence of perpetual dissents on
the Rehnquist Court, an era of the Court's recent history selected for methodological purposes and ease of discussion. After demonstrating that such
dissents are common, Part II continues the descriptive project by attempting
to identify when the Justices perpetually dissent and when they do not.
Parts III and IV then start a normative discussion on when and whether
perpetual dissents should be used. Part III asks whether a perpetual dissent
can be justified. It explores the possible value of a repeated dissent and then
discusses the potential adverse consequences. In Part IV, I offer my own
thoughts as to when a perpetual dissent is proper and when it is not. I argue
that authoring a perpetual dissent is problematic because the Justice is not
construing the law, but is instead pursuing a sort of "self stare decisis"elevating his commitment to an internally consistent personal jurisprudence
over a commitment to adhere faithfully to the Court's precedents. Though
these dissents possibly have value as a signal to legislatures or as a discussion starter, I submit that those functions are not the type traditionally assigned to judges, and thus one feels comfortable with perpetual dissents
only to the extent one is comfortable with a Justice acting outside of his
traditional role.
An alternative to the perpetual dissent is a separate writing that acknowledges a continued disagreement, but accepts the first decision as law.
11

See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 955 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]hose who
believe that a 5-to-4 vote on a policy matter by unelected lawyers should not overcome the judgment of
30 state legislatures have a problem, not with the application of Casey, but with its existence.").
12 See, e.g., Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coli. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 665
(1999) (Stevens, 1., dissenting) ("Until this expansive and judicially crafted protection of States' rights
runs its course, I shall continue to register my agreement with the views expressed in the Seminole
dissents and in the scholarly commentary on that case.").
13 See, e.g., Buckeye Check Cashing v. Cardenga, 546 U.S. 440, 449 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("I remain of the view that the Federal Arbitration Act ... does not apply to proceedings in state
court." (citation omitted)).
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The only time this sort of "concurrence under duress" approach is inadequate and must be replaced with a perpetual dissent, I suggest, is when a
Justice thinks the issue is an exceedingly important one in which the country will benefit from a continued discussion. But this, of course, is really a
political statement, and it is such an extraordinary judicial step that it
should be thought of, if you will, as an act of judicial civil disobedience. If
a perpetual dissent is ever justified, therefore, it must be used only rarely
and always deliberately. Thus used, perpetual dissents could become a
powerful communication device. If, however, they continue to be used on a
whole host of issues and without a discemable pattern, any potential value
of a perpetual dissent will be stifled by its over-use, and, moreover, the institutional consequences of such a heavy practice could be cause for alarm.
I.

THE PREYALENCE OF MODERN PERPETUAL DISSENTS

A.

What Is a Perpetual Dissent?

Dissents in general have not always been common practice on the Supreme Court. Indeed, it was not unusual as late as the 1930s for a Justice to
disagree with a majority of the Court but nonetheless decide not to record
his dissent (a practice known as "silent acquiescence"). 14 According to political scientists, the early 1940s and the New Deal era brought a "radical
and apparently permanent change" from unanimity to "surging rates of concurring and dissenting opinions." 15 While the first half of the twentieth century saw a fair number of dissents, the boon of separate opinions is a relatively recent phenomenon. Today's Court, all seem to agree, is one where
dissenting and concurring opinions have become the norm. 16
As separate opinions on the Court became more common, dissenters
also frequently began to repeat losing views on an issue in subsequent
cases. 17 Perhaps the most famous example of the perpetual dissent is the

14 G. Edward White, The Internal Powers of the Chief Justice: The Nineteenth-Century Legacy,
154 U. PA. L. REV. 1463, 1503 (2006).
15 Thomas G. Walker et al., On the Mysterious Demise of Consensual Norms in the United States
Supreme Court, 50 J. POL. 361, 361 (1988); see also LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES
JUSTICES MAKE 24 (1988); Lee Epstein eta!., The Norm of Consensus on the U.S. Supreme Court, 45
AM. J. POL. SCI., 362, 362 (2001); M. Todd Henderson, From Seriatim to Consensus and Back Again: A
Theory ofDissent 33-39 (Univ. of Chicago Law Sch. Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 263, 2007)
available at http:l/ssrn.com/abstract=IOI9074.
16 See Epstein et. a!., supra note 15, at 362, 363 fig.l; see also Linda Greenhouse, ideas &
Trends: Divided They Stand; The High Court and the Triumph ofDiscord, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2001 , §
4, at I.
17 Although the deluge of separate opinions since the 1940s substantially increased the opportunities for a justice to dissent perpetually, it would be error to assert that no one engaged in the practice
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long-standing practice of Justices Brennan and Marshall to dissent in every
death penalty case after 1976 when the Court upheld the constitutionality of
capital punishment-a view they repeated more than 2100 times, by one
commentator's count. 18 Though this might be the most dramatic example of
a perpetual dissent, Justices Brennan and Marshall are certainly not alone,
nor do traditionally liberal Justices have a comer on the market. Traditionally conservative Justices are just as likely to dissent perpetually on issues
such as abortion, 19 capital sentencing reform, 20 or punitive damages. 21
Though a "dissent" typically means an opinion rejecting the disposition reached by a majority of the Court, I also include concurring opinions
that disagree with the Court's reasoning even if ultimately reaching the
same outcome. Justice Scalia, who has offered the same definition for dissent, explains, "[l]egal opinions are important, after all, for the reasons they
give, not the results they announce .... [T]o get the reasons wrong is to get
it all wrong, and that is worth a dissent, even if the dissent is called a concurrence. " 22
Perpetual dissents, thus defined, come in all shapes and sizes-from
the "perfunctory notation" to the reiteration "renewed with fresh vigor and
elaboration. " 23 I define the phrase to include those opinions that reiterate a
past dissenting view and then offer a rationale different from the majority's
(either to concur or dissent). I exclude from my concept of a perpetual dissent instances where a Justice accepts a precedent reluctantly but refuses to
extend it, or when a Justice argues that the court incorrectly applied precedent (however misguided) in the present case. The critical feature of a perpetual dissent, according to my definition, is when a Justice refuses to accept the rule of a prior decision (one in which he originally dissented) as
controlling authority. 24
before that time. See Kelman, supra note 6, at 249-50 (referencing examples of "repetitious dissent" in
the 1800s).
l8 See Mello, supra note 6, at 593.
19 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood ofSe. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,944 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting) ("We believe that Roe was wrongly decided, and that it can and should be overruled consistently with our traditional approach to stare decisis in constitutional cases.").
20 See, e.g., Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 293 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I have previously expressed my view that this 'right' to unchanneled sentencer discretion has no basis in the Constitution. I have also said that the Court's decisions establishing this right do not deserve stare decisis
effect .... "(citation omitted)).
21 See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) ("I would affirm the judgment below because I continue to believe that the Constitution does
not constrain the size of punitive damage awards." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
22 Antonin Scalia, The Dissenting Opinion, 1994 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 33, 33.
23 See Kelman, supra note 6, at 230.
24 To illustrate this distinction, compare the dissents of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia
in Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000). The Chief acknowledged the legitimacy of Casey in his
dissent, but found that the majority misapplied its holding. ld at 952 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Justice Scalia, on the other hand, condemned Casey, calling it "a 5-to-4 vote on a policy matter by un-
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At this point, one might start to wonder what the options look like for
a Justice who is asked to apply a precedent in which she dissented originally and one she continues to believe is wrong. No one on the Court continues to dissent on every issue that he has lost before; sometimes, they
acquiescence to the new rule, despite residual hostility towards it. The second Justice Harlan offers perhaps the most famous contrast to the perpetual
dissenter. 25 A known critic of Mapp v. Ohio 26 and Miranda v. Arizona, 27
Justice Harlan routinely joined subsequent cases that required application of
those precedents, 28 and he even argued for their retroactive application despite his original dissent and strong opposition to them. 29 To be sure, Harlan
did not gleefully follow these Warren Court rules that he considered illegitimate. He would often write separately to explain, for example, that
"[t]he passage of time has not made the Miranda case any more palatable to
me than it was when the case was decided. " 30 But, he still felt bound to accept the prior decision as precedent, explaining "purely out of respect for
stare decisis, I reluctantly feel compelled to acquiesce ...." 31
A modem day example of such acquiescence can be found in Clark v.
Martinez, 32 a recent immigration case. Clark involved an alien detained in
the United States for a long period of time pending removal because no
other country agreed to receive him. 33 Three years before Clark, the Court
had concluded in Zadvydas v. Davis 34 that the government could not detain
an alien indefinitely without violating the Due Process Clause. 35 It thus read
the removal statute to contain an implicit limitation on how long an alien
could be detained. 36 Four Justices (Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Scalia, and
Chief Justice Rehnquist) vigorously dissented, claiming that the majority
had strayed from the text and "written a statutory amendment of its own.'m
elected lawyers." !d. at 955 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia's approach is what I would call a perpetual
dissent, while the Chiefs approach is not. The difference is that one continues to decry the legitimacy of
a precedent, while the other recognizes the decision as deserving of precedential effect (despite any
residual hostility to it).
25 See Kelman, supra note 6, at 274-76.
26 367 u.s. 643 (1961).
27 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
28 See Donald A. Dripps, Justice Harlan on Criminal Procedure: Two Cheers for the Legal Process School, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 125, 161 (2005).
29

TINSLEY YARBROUGH, JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN: GREAT DISSENTER ON THE WARREN COURT

135 (1992).
30 Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 327 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring).
31 Id. at 328.
32 543 u.s. 371 (2005).
33 !d. at 373-76. For further discussion of Clark, see Jonathan R. Siegel, The Polymorphic Principle and the Judicial Role in Statutory Interpretation, 84 TEX. L. REv. 339, 346-50 (2005).
34 533 u.s. 678 (2001).
35 !d. at 690.
36 Id. at 689.
37 !d. at 705.
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When Clark (involving a different category of aliens) came before them,
the Zadvydas dissenters did something interesting. Justice Thomas, joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissented again, claiming that Zadvydas had
been wrongly decided and did not deserve stare decisis effect. 38 To the surprise of many, however, Justice Scalia (a Zadvydas dissenter) actually authored the majority opinion in Clark, which Justice Kennedy joined. Justice
Scalia expressed concern that the opposite holding would establish "the
dangerous principle that judges can give the same statutory text different
meanings in different cases." 39 For the sake of consistency, therefore, Justice Scalia applied a rule that he had once condemned as illegitimate. 40
B.

Perpetual Dissents on the Rehnquist Court

So, when do the Justices choose to dissent perpetually and when do
they capitulate to the majority? In attempting to distill some pattern, I reviewed all of what I have deemed "dissents" from 1986 (the year Chief
Justice Rehnquist was appointed) to 2005 (the year of Chief Justice Roberts's appointment). The results are surprising, as I found perpetual dissents
from every member of the Rehnquist Court and on a wide variety of subject
matter.
I chose the Rehnquist Court as my focus for two reasons. First, since
this era of the Court's history had a very consistent membership over time,
these Justices had ample opportunity to see issues repeat on their docket,
and thus the time period offers us an excellent petri dish for exploring occurrences of perpetual dissents. Further, this petri dish is an important one;
to the extent this trend of longevity in service continues, the abundance of
perpetual dissents may persist as well. 41
For simplicity's sake, I have broken down my research into two
groups of Justices: those who frequently engage in perpetual dissent, and
those who seem to dissent only occasionally. Unsurprisingly, several ofthe
frequent perpetual dissenters are those Justices, like Justice Thomas, with
relatively weaker views on stare decisis-those who place adherence to
38 Clark, 543 U.S. at 401 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
39 Jd. at 386 (majority opinion).
40 As I will discuss more fully below, the fact that Clark and Zadvydas were cases of statutory
interpretation is not insignificant. Justice Scalia has made it explicit elsewhere that "[d]eparture from
our rule of stare decisis in statutory cases is always extraordinary." Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 506
(2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Whereas, by contrast, "claims of stare decisis are at their weakest in
[Constitutional law], where our mistakes cannot be corrected by Congress." Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S.
267, 305 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
41 In the way of a brief disclaimer, please note that my descriptive claims are based on a survey of
the Court's opinions, but I do not employ a particular empirical method. I do not claim to have exhausted the field of perpetual dissents; my goal is only to discuss the ramifications of a currently widespread practice of the Court through illustrative examples.
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prior precedent below other allegiances, such as originalism. Even a Justice
with a weaker view of stare decisis, however, will perpetually dissent only
on some issues and not on others. And, conversely, a Justice with a stronger
allegiance to stare decisis (Justice Souter, for example) still perpetually
dissents on occasion. The goal of this Essay is not to keep track of who
perpetually dissents more than whom. The interesting observation, instead,
is that all of the Justices perpetually dissent for some reason or another; and
the quest of this Essay is to explore potential justifications for the practice.
1.

The Big Perpetual Dissenters

During Rehnquist's tenure as Chief Justice, Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, Scalia, and Thomas were the most prolific authors of perpetual dissents. Justices Brennan and Marshall are likely the most famous due
to their oft-repeated condemnation of the death penalty. 42 These two Justices, however, registered their continued disagreement on quite a few additional topics during the Rehnquist Court, including the scope of the Eleventh Amendment, 43 the applicability of Younger abstention to civil proceedings, 44 and the propriety of summarily reversing decisions. 45
Though perhaps not as well-known, Justice Stevens's repertoire of
perpetual dissents is equally varied. The most noted example of his perpetual dissent is his decision (along with three of his colleagues) to continually
record a disdain for the Rehnquist Court's federalism jurisprudence, specifically the Seminole Tribe decision. 46 He has explained that "[d]espite my
respect for stare decisis, I am unwilling to accept Seminole Tribe as controlling precedent,"47 and "[u]ntil this expansive and judicicHly crafted protection of States' rights runs its course, I shall continue to register my
agreement with the views expressed in the Seminole Tribe dissents and in
the scholarly commentary ...." 48
Sovereign immunity is not the only area that has drawn Justice Stevens's repeated criticism. Largely alone, he continues to this day to dissent
perpetually from the Court's practice of denying in forma pauperis status to
indigent litigants who have "abused the writ of cert" by filing too many
42 See, e.g., Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 324 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Boyde
v. California, 494 U.S. 393, 370 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
43 See, e.g., Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 233 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
44 See, e.g., New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 373 (1989)
(Brennan, J ., dissenting).
45 See, e.g., Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 50 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Rhodes
v. Stewart, 488 U.S. I, 4-5 (1988) (MarshaiiJ., dissenting).
46 See Siegel, supra note 6, at 1182.
47 Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 97 ( 1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
48 Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coli. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 665 (1999)
(Stevens, J ., dissenting).
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petitions. 49 And, though less of a persistent campaign, he has also perpetually dissented in cases involving election law,S0 the Sixth Amendment, 51 the
First Amendment/ 2 the Twenty-First Amendment, 53 and even on a small
question of administrative law. 54
Justice Thomas chooses different subjects on which to persistently reiterate his disagreement with precedent. He has repeated his position that
the Court's dormant Commerce Clause cases are illegitimate, 55 and that it is
time to "rethink" the modem interpretation of the Establishment Clause. 56
Justice Thomas has often sustained a view that a prior decision is incorrect
and undeserving of stare decisis effect; he has said so much with respect to
Casey in the context of abortion, 57 Penry with respect to the Eighth
Amendment, 58 Buckley in the campaign finance arena, 59 and Central Hudson when it is used to evaluate commercial speech.60 And, as we saw in the
Clark case discussed above, Justice Thomas is also willing to dissent per49 See, e.g., Azukbuko v. Zobel, 127 S. Ct. 686, 686 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting); In re Bauer,
528 U.S. 16, 17 (Stevens, J., dissenting); In re Kennedy, 525 U.S. 153, 154 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Glendora v. Porzio, 523 U.S. 206, 207 (1998) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Brown v. Williams, 522
U.S. I, I (1997)(Stevens,J.,dissenting).
50 See, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 918 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("As I have explained on prior occasions, I am convinced that the Court' s aggressive supervision of state action designed to accommodate the political concerns of historically disadvantaged minority groups is seriously
misguided.").
51 See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 727-28 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring)
("For the reasons stated in my dissent in Walters v. National Assn. of Radiation Survivors .. . I remain
convinced that such regulation may not be so pervasive as to deny the individual the right to consult and
retain independent counsel." (citation omitted)).
52 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 674 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("I continue to
believe that the Government may not penalize speakers for making available to the general World Wide
Web audience that which the least tolerant communities in America deem unfit for their children's
consumption.").
53 See, e.g., Newport v. Iacobucci, 479 U.S. 92, 97 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("As I have
previously written, the reasoning in the per curiam summary disposition in New York State Liquor
Authority v. Bellanca is blatantly incorrect." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
54 See. e.g., IRS v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 494 U.S. 922, 938 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("I have previously endorsed the view that the Circular is not an applicable law, and I still think that
conclusion is correct.").
55 See, e.g., Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 545 U.S. 429, 439 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring); Hillside Dairy Inc. v. Lyons, 539 U.S. 59, 68 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
56 See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. I, 45 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring).
57 See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 982 (2000) (Thomas J., dissenting).
58 See, e.g., Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 294 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
59 See, e.g., McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 266 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Fed. Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 164 (2003)
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
60 See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 377 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring);
Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 197 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring);
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457,504 (1997) (Thomas, J. , dissenting).
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petually in some statutory cases, including, for example, his recurring statements in dissent that the Federal Arbitration Act does not apply to proceedings in state court. 61
Justice Scalia is perhaps most famous for "continu[ing] to dissent from
this enterprise of devising an Abortion Code, and from the illusion that we
have authority to do so." 62 But he has also perpetually dissented on the
Court's role in restricting punitive damages; 63 the use of victim impact evidence;64 Eighth Amendment restrictions on capital sentencing/5 First
Amendment protection for pomography; 66 the constitutionality of campaign
finance reform; 67 the application of the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar successive punishment (as opposed to successive prosecution); 68 questions of
what statute of limitations to use when a federal statute is silent; 69 and administrative law questions on deference due to agency interpretations. 70
2.

The "Recreational Users" of the Perpetual Dissent

Though the above Justices are the "heavy users" of the perpetual dissent, every member of the Rehnquist Court dabbled in the practice on one
issue or another. Chief Justice Rehnquist persistently registered his disagreement with the Court's abortion cases, 71 its dormant Commerce Clause

61 See, e.g., Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681,689 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
62 Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417,480 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Stenberg, 530
U.S. at 952 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 250 (1989)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
63 See. e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
64 See, e.g., South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 823 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting), overrnled
by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
65 See, e.g., Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 147-48 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring); Smith v.
Texas, 543 U.S. 37, 49 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 293-94 (2004)
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269,279 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring).
66 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 676 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting); City of Littleton
v. ZJ. Gifts D-4, LLC., 541 U.S. 774, 787-88 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring).
67 See, e.g., McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 257 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring

in part and dissenting in part).
68 See, e.g., United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 297 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring); Witte v.
United States, 515 U.S. 389, 406-07 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring).
69 See, e.g., Reed v. United Transp., 488 U.S. 319, 334 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
70 See, e.g., Raymond B. Yates, M.D., P.C. Profit Sharing Plan v. Hendon, 541 U.S. 1, 24 (2004)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (registering his continual disagreement with the Court's decision in United States
v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001)).
71
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865-69 (1992) (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting). Although, as noted above, the Chief later modified his view on this issue in his dissent
in Stenberg. See supra note 24.
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jurisprudence as it pertains to hazardous waste removal, 72 and its interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause with respect to unemployment compensation for those who quit their jobs for religious reasons. 73 Justice O'Connor
also repeated her dissent on the Court's interpretation of the Free Exercise
Clause, 74 as well as in cases involving First Amendment protection for attorney advertising, 75 and in cases holding that the Federal Arbitration Act
applies to state proceedings. 76 Justice Breyer perpetually dissented in the
Court's Sixth Amendment sentencing reform cases, 77 the sovereign immunity Seminole Tribe line of cases, 78 and the Court's interpretation of the
Commerce Clause. 79
Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg appear more hesitant to engage in a perpetual dissent, but they have each still done it with respect to at
least one issue. Justice Kennedy reiterated his resistance to Austin and
Buckley in the Court's campaign finance cases. 80 Justice Ginsburg continues to adhere to her position that "the Court has no warrant to reform state
laws governing awards of punitive damages." 81 And Justice Souter engages
in perpetual dissents to withhold "any implicit approval of the holding in
Seminole Tribe." 82
Finally, Justices Powell, White, and Blackmun retired towards the beginning of the Rehnquist Court, and thus (like Justices Brennan and Marshall) this Essay captures only a few of the years where they may have had
the opportunity to dissent perpetually. Yet even within this time period,
72 See, e.g., Chern. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. HWlt, 504 U.S. 334, 349-50 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J,
dissenting).
73 See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 146-47 (1987)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
14 See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 544-45 (1997) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("I
remain of the view that Smith was wrongly decided .... Indeed, if I agreed with the Court's standard in
Smith, I would join the opinion.").
75 See, e.g., Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466,481 (1988) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
76 See, e.g., Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483,494 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
77 See, e.g., Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 329 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The Justices who have dissented from Apprendi have written about many of these matters in other opinions. At
the risk of some repetition, I shall set forth several of the most important considerations here. They lead
me to the conclusion that I must again dissent." (citations omitted)).
78 See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 772 (2002) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting); Coli. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 699 (1999)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
79 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 663 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
80 See, e.g., McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 326 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I dissented in Austin and continue to believe that the case represents
an indefensible departure from our tradition of free and robust debate." (citation omitted)); Nixon v.
Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 410 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
8l State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 431 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
82 Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440,455 (2004) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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they have each done it at least once. Justice Powell continued to insist that
his dissenting opinion in Patterson contained the proper test for when a
state may shift the burden of proof in criminal cases. 83 Justice Blackmun,
though a late-corner to the crusade to dissent on every death penalty case,
added his name to the effort, 84 and also perpetually dissented on whether
commercial speech deserves full First Amendment protection, 85 and on
whether laws that discriminate against the mentally retarded should be subjected to heightened review. 86 And Justice White's perpetual opposition to
Buckley in the campaign finance arena was actually invoked many years
later in Justice Stevens's dissent in Randall v. Sorre/187 where he explained:
"Justice White refused to abandon his opposition to Buckley .... Over the
course of his steadfast campaign, he converted at least one other Buckley
participant to this position and his reasoning has since persuaded me ... as
well. " 88
II.

WHEN DO THE JUSTICES PERPETUALLY DISSENT? IS THERE A
PATTERN?

Knowing, as we now do, that perpetual dissents are common in recent
history, it is natural to consider what factors go into determining when they
are unleashed. Or, in other words, as this next part of this Essay will describe: When does a Justice perpetually dissent? No Justice continues to
dissent every time he thinks the Court has gone astray in a certain area.
Sometimes they acquiesce, bowing to stare decisis despite continued disagreement with the Court's legal rule.
Compare, for example, Justice Kennedy's behavior in two recent "hot
button" areas of constitutional law. Although Kennedy was a vocal dissenter in the Sixth Amendment case of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 89 he nonetheless concurred in the subsequent case Ring v. Arizona/0 explaining that
"[t]hough it is still my view that Apprendi v. New Jersey was wrongly decided, Apprendi is now the law, and its holding must be implemented in a
principled way." 91 This attitude presents an interesting contrast to the one
Justice Kennedy expressed in Federal Election Commission v. Beaumont, 92
a campaign finance case. Though ultimately concurring in the judgment for
83
84
85
86
87

88
89

90
91
92

See, e.g., Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 242 (1987) (Powell, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967,984 (1994) (Biackmun, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 777-78 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Hellerv. Doe, 509 U.S. 312,334 (1993) (Biackmun, J., dissenting).
126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006).
/d. at 2508 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
530 u.s. 466 (2000).
536 U.S. 584 (2002).
/d. at 613 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
539 u.s. 146 (2003).
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other reasons, Justice Kennedy boldly asserted that "[m]y posttton, expressed in dissenting opinions in previous cases, has been that the Court
erred in sustaining certain [campaign finance laws] . . . . I adhere to that
view, and so can give no weight to those authorities [Nixon v. Shrink, for
example] in the instant case." 93 Presumably, Justice Kennedy's views on
stare decisis did not change between the two cases. What would make Justice Kennedy acknowledge the precedential value of Apprendi but not of
Nixon v. Shrink when he dissented from both cases quite vigorously?
Perhaps the question of when to dissent perpetually is idiosyncratic
and cannot be explained collectively. Justices are, after all, individuals who
have evolving working relationships with colleagues and, for some, a sense
of the law's fluidity. As part of the descriptive goal of this Essay, however,
I attempted to distill some pattern that would explain the use of perpetual
dissents across the board. I speculated that the decision to dissent again
might be connected to an intensity of conviction, or perhaps with the freshness of the precedent, or maybe with how close they feel they are to achieving that fifth vote necessary to tum the dissenting view into the majority.
None of the theories. proposed as an explanation for perpetual dissents,
however, provides a completely satisfactory explanation. The absence of a
pattern, however, is itself an interesting observation and has significance for
the justification and proper use of perpetual dissents, as will be explored in
Parts III and IV below.
First, a word on the pattern I did discover. Most Justices seem to agree
that dissents on issues of statutory construction deserve less repetition. Justice Stevens, for example, eventually gave in to the majority's interpretation
of Title VII in employment discrimination cases involving post-Act seniority systems, despite his prior dissent on the subject. 94 Chief Justice
Rehnquist acknowledged that his view did not prevail in Armco Inc. v.
Hardesty, 95 and hence did not continue to dissent in tax cases applying the
substantial equivalence test. 96 Justice O'Connor, who (like Justice Thomas)
once perpetually dissented on the question whether the Federal Arbitration
Act should apply to state court proceedings, later gave up the effort, signing

93 ld. at 163-64 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
94 See, e.g., Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 913 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring)
("Although I remain convinced that the Court misconstrued Title VII in American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, the Court has correctly applied those decisions to the case at hand. And it is the Court' s construction of the statute-rather than the views of an individual Justice-that becomes a part of the law."
(citations omitted)).
95 467 u.s. 638 (1984).
96 See, e.g., Fulton Corp v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 348 (1996) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) ("I
have expressed in dissent my belief that the ' substantial equivalence' test deviates from the principle
articulated in earlier cases .... However, my view has not prevailed, and Darnell simply cannot be
reconciled with the compensatory-tax decisions cited in the Court's opinion. I therefore join the opinion
of the Court." (citations omitted)).
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on without comment to cases applying the counter holding in Southland. 97
Justice Scalia also stopped fighting the Southland decision, though not
without announcing that he would "stand ready to join four other Justices in
overruling it." 98
Fewer perpetual dissents in statutory cases aligns with the conventional wisdom that stare decisis concerns are at their strongest in this area. 99
A Justice need not suffer sleepless nights over what he or she considers an
erroneous statutory decision for "the obvious reason that Congress can correct a construction it did not intend or does not presently approve, a move
ordinarily not open to it in the constitutional context." 100 Thus, Justice Stevens, who has perpetually dissented on a host of topics, will even acquiesce
on statutory issues, saying "it is the Court's construction of the statuterather than the views of an individual Justice-that becomes a part of the
law." 101
Sustained dissents in constitutional law, perhaps due to the weaker
force of stare decisis at work and because the Constitution, as Justice Peter
Daniel once put it, "is above all precedents," are far more common. 102
Every Justice on the Rehnquist Court had at least one constitutional law
decision he could not bring himself to follow, and many found themselves
repeating a past dissent on a multitude of issues. 103 After looking through all
of these dissents, however, I simply could not find a pattern or satisfactory
explanation for when the Justices feel justified to dissent perpetually on
constitutional issues and when they do not. I unsuccessfully tried out three
propositions.
One theory was that the Justices perpetually dissent for strategic reasons-as an attempt to gain that elusive fifth vote one day. Under this theory, the dissenters are motivated because the original decision was so
deeply divided, they feel corrective action must be inevitable. Some of the
perpetual dissents do occur when the Court is split five to four. This is true
of the four Justices who refuse to recognize the legitimacy of Seminole
Tribe, and the same four Justices who adhere to their dissent in Lopez on
the proper scope of the Commerce Clause. 104 It is also true for the four Jus97 Compare Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 494 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (reasserting
that the Court's decision in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. I, 10 (1984), which held that a California arbitration law was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act, was unfaithful to congressional
intent), with Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 689 (1996) (holding that a Montana arbitration law was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act under the Court's decision in Southland).
98 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 285 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
99 See Lee, supra note 5, at 703-04.
100 John Hart Ely, The Supreme Court, 1977 Term-Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REv. 5, 10 n.33 (1978).
101 Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900,913 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring).
102 Rundle v. Del. & Raritan Canal Co., 55 U.S. (14 How.) 80, 99 (1852) (Daniels, J., dissenting).
103 See supra Part I.B.
104 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,663 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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tices (Scalia, White, O'Connor, and the Chief Justice) who perpetually dissented on the question of the admissibility of victim impact evidence (those
dissenters were later appeased when Booth v. Maryland 105 was overruled
after a change in the Court's membership). 106
In practice, however, five to four decisions were not more likely to
spawn perpetual dissents on the Rehnquist Court. Many perpetual dissents
continue, as one scholar described it, "past the limits of hope, beyond the
appeal to the intelligence of a future day, and into the realm of the quixotic." 107 Indeed, perhaps the most famous "campaign" of perpetual dissents,
the one by Justices Brennan and Marshall to find the death penalty unconstitutional, was basically a two-man operation (although Justice Blackmun
eventually joined the fight) without any hope of foreseeable vindication.
Similarly, another duo, Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia, have continually
teamed up to reassert their view that the Eighth Amendment is not violated
when a jury's discretion to consider mitigating evidence is limited. 108
Further, there are many examples of solo perpetual dissents. At least
since 1991, Justice Stevens has dissented alone in every opinion that denied
in forma pauperis status to petitioners who have filed too many frivolous
cert petitions. 109 Similarly, Justice Thomas is not hesitant to repeat his lone
views-like, for example, his claim that there is no such thing as a dormant
Commerce Clause-even if his arguments are not likely to attract a majority any time soon. 110 Not just the "big perpetual dissenters" go it alone. In
Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 111 Justice O'Connor, alone,
repeated her view-voiced originally in a dissent in Edmonson-that the
conduct of a private actor is not subject to constitutional challenges if the

105 482 U.S. 496 (1987), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 50 I U.S. 808 ( 1991 ).
106 For an example of a perpetual dissent on Booth, see South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805,
823 (Scalia, J., dissenting), overruled by Payne, 501 U.S. 808.
107 Kelman, supra note 6, at 257.
108 See, e.g., Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 147-48 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring); Smith v.
Texas, 543 U.S. 37, 49 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 279 (1988)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
109 See, e.g., Zatko v. California, 502 U.S. 16, 18 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting); In re Bauer, 528
U.S. 16, 17 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting); In re Kennedy, 525 U.S. 153, 154 (1999) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Glendora v. Porzio, 523 U.S. 206, 207 (1998) (Stevens, J. , dissenting); Brown v. Williams,
522 U.S. I, I ( 1997) (Stevens, J ., dissenting).
110 See, e.g., Am. Trucking v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Cornrn'n, 545 U.S. 429, 439-(2005) (Thomas, J.,
concurring). Though once accompanied by Justice Scalia in this view, Justice Thomas now goes at it
alone. Justice Scalia has noted his "continuing adherence to the view that the so-called 'negative' Commerce Clause is an unjustified judicial invention," but he has concluded, "on stare decisis grounds" that
he will enforce a negative Commerce Clause challenge in two situations only (laws that facially discriminate against interstate commerce and laws that are indistinguishable from ones previously held
unconstitutional by the Court). Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 312 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Ill 513U.S. 374(1995).
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conduct was private in nature. 112 And Chief Justice Rehnquist (a rare perpetual dissenter) dissented by himself in Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals
Commission of Florida, 113 simply to adhere to a lone dissent he wrote in
Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division 114 on
whether the denial of unemployment compensation to an employee who
quit for religious reasons violates the Free Exercise Clause. 115
To add to the confusion, some Justices will give up their perpetual dissent, even in the face of a new five to four decision to affirm the majority
view. If the Justices were using strategy to determine when a perpetual dissent was proper, one would not expect to see such acquiescence in a
closely-divided decision. Yet several Justices have displayed just this sort
of behavior. Justices O'Connor and Souter were among the dissenters in
Veronia School District 47J v. Acton, 116 a case that upheld state-compelled
urine testing in schools under the Fourth Amendment. Yet seven years later,
in Board of Education of Independent School District 92 v. Earls, 117 a five
to four decision, they wrote separately to acknowledge that despite continued disagreement with Veronia, they believed it was the proper precedent to
apply. liS Likewise, in a more familiar example, Chief Justice Rehnquist
reiterated his Roe dissent in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 119 but years later
acknowledged Casey's legitimacy in his separate opinion in Stenberg v.
Carhart, 120 another contentious five to four opinion. These examples of
acquiescence are hard to explain if strategy is really the dominating factor
in deciding when to unleash a perpetual dissent.
A second discredited hypothesis to describe when Justices perpetually
dissent considers the age of the original decision, and this theory could
work in one of two ways. On the one hand, "there is a sense in which the
newly minted precedent deserves a special immunity from overruling." 121
Thus one might expect perpetual dissents on new decisions to be rare as the
Justices adopt a "probationary precedent" allowing time for the decision "to
demonstrate its merits and to dispel the doubts raised by the dissent." 122 On
the other hand, however, stare decisis concerns are arguably weaker for a
new decision as it has had less of a chance to accrue reliance interests; so
perhaps one could expect more perpetual dissents right away and fewer
dissents as a decision ages.
11 2 Jd. at 409 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
113 480 u.s. 136 (1987).
114 450 u.s. 707 -(1981).
115 Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 148 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
116 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
117 536 u.s. 822 (2002).
118 /d. at 842 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
119 505 U.S. 833, 944 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
120 530 U.S. 914,952 (2000) (Rehnquisl, C.J., dissenting).
121 Kelman, supra note 6, at 234.
122 Jd.
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Unfortunately, neither account adequately explains the perpetual dissents on the Rehnquist Court because there are many examples of reiterated
hostility towards old and new precedents alike. Buckley continues to stimulate repeated dissent thirty years after it was decided in 1976, 123 as does
Penry's 1989 holding about the constitutional limits of a capital sentencing
jury's discretion. 124 Indeed, Miranda, a 1966 decision that might have
seemed old and stable by the tum of the century, was declared illegitimate
in 2000 by Justices Scalia and Thomas who announced in dissent that they
could not adhere to an erroneous decision even if it was a "celebrated
one." 125 By contrast, Ashcroft v. ACLU, 126 a case from 2002 about the First
Amendment implications of child protective internet legislation, spawned a
perpetual dissent within two years. 127 And Seminole Tribe was on the books
only for three years before Justice Stevens declared he would continue to
register his disagreement with it, 128 and Justice Breyer explained he was
"not yet ready to adhere to" it. 129 Since practice shows neither old nor new
precedents are safe from perpetual dissents, the age of a precedent does not
adequately explain when a Justice feels sustained dissents are proper.
My third and final hypothesis about when justices perpetually dissent
also proved ultimately unsatisfactory as a perfect predictor, but could provide the most logical explanation. A Justice may continue to renew a dissenting opinion simply because he or she really cares about the issue. Might
not plain old strong conviction be what is driving these perpetual dissents?
Justice Brennan seemed to think so. While lecturing on dissents generally
he explained that a repeated dissent, what he called a "special kind" of dissent, is the Justice's way of saying "Here I draw the line." 130 Perhaps, figuring out why a Justice perpetually dissents is as simple as finding, frankly,
what pushes his or her individual buttons. This theory would certainly explain some of the perpetual dissents on the Rehnquist Court. Thus, for example, due to the heightened emotions that surround the death penalty, one
can easily understand why Justices Brennan and Marshall would feel a continued need to "draw the line" on the constitutionality of capital punishment.

l23 See, e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct 2479, 2506 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
124 See. e.g., Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 293 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
l25 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 465 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
126 535 u.s. 564 (2002).
127 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 674 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("I continue to believe
that the Government may not penalize speakers for making available to the general World Wide Web
audience that which the least tolerant communities in America deem unfit for their children's consumption ...."(citation omitted)).
128 Coli. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,691-92 (1999)
(Stevens, J ., dissenting).
129 !d. at 699 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
130 Brennan, supra note 4, at 437.
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The inverse of this theory would allow us to deduce from a Justice's
limited use of perpetual dissents where his strong convictions must lie. Justice Souter, for example, only reiterates dissent to note a continued disapproval of Seminole Tribe, so it might be safe to assume that he "draws the
line" at the Court's sovereign immunity doctrine. 131 Justice Scalia has actually told us what pushes his buttons, noting that "when ... a constitutional
doctrine adopted by the Court is not only mistaken but also insusceptible of
principled application, I do not feel bound to give it stare decisis effectindeed I do not feel justified in doing so." 132 He adds, "I think it appropriate, in other words-indeed, I think it necessary-for a judge whose view
of the law causes him to dissent from an overruling to persist in that position (at least where his vote is necessary to the disposition of the case) with
respect to action taken before the overruling occurred." 133
Connecting perpetual dissents to strength of conviction has intuitive
appeal, and it comports with the idea (explored below) that a perpetual dissent really functions as an act of judicial civil disobedience-a way for a
Justice to send a message to the country alerting them to a critical mis-step
in the Court's doctrine. 134 But this description presents two problems. The
frrst is overuse. If perpetual dissents are used only when a Justice feels very
strongly about a particular issue, it is hard to explain the extremely wide
variety of topics on which repeated dissents have been written. And, if perpetual dissents are used frequently and on a wide variety of topics, they
quickly lose their justification as an extreme sign of protest. 135 When overused, these judicial acts of civil disobedience begin to look like simple
stubbornness, and it becomes hard to believe that deep conviction is really
what is doing the work.
The second problem with this theory is the inconsistency of acquiescence. To the extent the Justices feel justified in perpetually dissenting because of a deep moral conviction, or (like Justice Scalia) because they feel
stare decisis effect is unwarranted for one reason or another, then what explains the times when they eventually acquiescence on these tough issues?
In 2000, Justice Scalia declared that he would henceforth apply the voluntariness test of 18 U.S.C. §3501 instead of the protections afforded by
Miranda. 136 He made this announcement with great gusto, insisting that "we
cannot allow to remain on the books even a celebrated decision-especially
a celebrated decision-that has come to stand for the proposition that the
13 1 See, e.g., Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 455 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring).
132 BMW ofN. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 US 559,599 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
133 Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 202 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
134 See infra Part IV.
135 See infra Part IV.
136 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428,465 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Supreme Court has power to impose extraconstitutional constraints upon
Congress and the States." 137 Six years later, however, this threat is left
empty as Justice Scalia never again referenced his Dickerson dissent and
has even joined a number of decisions since 2000 that apply Miranda. 138
Similarly, Justice Thomas has lessened his resistance to the Court's holding
that conditions of confinement are punishment with respect to the Eighth
Amendment. 139 And, Justice Breyer, who had repeatedly called for the demise of preemptory strikes to jurors, now joins opinions that apply the
Court's present legal framework for addressing these challenges. 140
Perhaps the deep conviction that fuels perpetual dissents has a shelf
life, lasting only until the Justice assumes he has bigger fish to fry or realizes he is fighting a losing battle. If that is so, that behavior somewhat undercuts the conviction theory for describing the perpetual dissent landscape,
as circumstances external to the Justices' individual fervor on an issue play
a part in the decision on when to dissent perpetually and when to refrain.

III. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PERPETUAL DISSENT: CAN IT BE
JUSTIFIED?

The practice of reiterating a dissenting view in a subsequent case may
be widespread and varied, but a big question remains-why does it matter?
Some students of the Court are likely to find a robust practice of perpetual
dissents not troubling at all: the Court overrules itself all the time, they
might say, and there is nothing illegitimate about a Justice calling for
change when he thinks the Court has gone astray. But it is important toremember that justifying a perpetual dissent is a different task from justifying
a decision to overrule a precedent. To understand the distinction, consider
the following hypothetical: two Justices, Alito and Stevens, confront a case
that squarely presents the option to apply or to overrule Martin, the Court's
decision denying in forma pauperis status to indigent litigants who have
"abused the writ of cert" by filing too many petitions. Their decisions
should be based on: (1) whether they think Martin was wrongly decided
(for whatever reason); and (2) if so, whether their views on stare decisis
justify adhering to the Court's original decision. Scholars have debated for
years over the nature of these two factors and how they interplay, but this
Essay presents a different debate: Should the answer to this question differ
137 !d.
138 See, e.g., United States v Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004); Missouri v. Seibert 542 U.S. 600 (2004)
(Scalia, J., joining O'Connor, J., dissenting on other grounds); Yarborough v. Alvarado, 54 I U.S. 652
(2004); Chavez v. Martinez 538 U.S. 760 (2003).
139 See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 759 n.I2 (Thomas, J., dissenting on other grounds).
140 See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 173 (2005) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("I join the
Court's opinion while maintaining the views I set forth in my concurring opinion in Miller-£/ v.
Dretke." (citation omitted)).
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for the two Justices because only one of them was on the Court at the time
of the original decision? To isolate the variable, assume that Justices Stevens and Alito both think Martin was wrongly decided and both share the
same view on stare decisis and agree that none of the "special circumstances" ordinarily proffered as reasons to depart from stare decisis justify
abandoning the precedent. Under those circumstances, should Justice Stevens be freer to dissent because he was part of the original Court that decided the question and lodged his disagreement from the beginning? Is
there any reason, in other words, why the mere fact of a prior dissent should
influence a subsequent decision to apply the precedent?
My answer to that question is no, in almost all circumstances. And,
conversely, I do not think it should matter to a new justice that he was not a
member of the Court when a precedent was decid.ed. The only two questions, I believe, that should play into a Justice's decision about when to
apply a controlling case are: Does he think the rule stated by the precedent
is wrong, and is there a reason to depart from stare decisis? To me, the
moment a Justice asks a third question and takes into account the consistency of his individual jurisprudential legacy at the expense of applying a
settled rule of law, he has fundamentally altered his judicial role in an unacceptable way. Reasonable minds can disagree on this conclusion, however,
and to form your own view on perpetual dissents, it is worth theorizing
what function a perpetual dissent serves and what adverse consequences it
could create.
A

Potential Justifications for Perpetual Dissents

Perhaps perpetual dissents can be justified as a method to signal to legislators, lawyers, and prospective litigants that the time has come for a
precedent to be overruled, or that a legal principle has been stretched to its
limit and will not be extended or cannot survive much longer. In a statutory
case, for example, a perpetual dissent can easily communicate to the legislature involved that a corrective amendment is necessary. The signaling
value of a perpetual dissent applies to constitutional cases as well. In the
words of Justice Scalia, regular dissents are beneficial because they "inform
the public in general, and the Bar in particular, about the state of the Court's
collective mind." 141 To the extent this is a benefit of a regular dissent, it is
amplified in the context of a repeated one. A pattern of resistance, far more
than a strongly-worded single dissent, indicates that a precedent is vulnerable and can perhaps prompt action from eager challengers.
To take a concrete and recent example, many people believe that the
proponents of "Act 64"-the Vermont campaign finance legislation that
was at issue in the 2006 case Randall v. Sorell-were well aware that their
14 1 Scalia, supra note 22, at 38.
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legislation pushed the limits of Buckley. 142 Some people believe, in fact,
that the legislature actually designed the bill as a vehicle for the Court to
overturn its 1976 decision (an invitation, of course, that the Court declined
to accept). 143 Buckley is a decision that has engendered repeated criticism
from several members of the Court throughout the years. 144 It is possible, at
least, that these perpetual dissents encouraged Vermonters to push the envelope and challenge Buckley through legislation; the dissents might have
conveyed to those eager to hear that the time was ripe for a change.
To the extent we think experimentation in local legislation is a road to
progress (particularly in an area as dicey as that of campaign finance reform), then perpetual dissents can be useful. Such experiments are more
likely to occur if the public realizes that the "collective mind of the Court"
is open to change. Without the dicta from various Justices expressing a desire to overrule Buckley, then perhaps the creators of Act 64 would not have
wasted their time. The point is not to trumpet the virtues of Act 64, but to
forecast the possibility of an Act 65-potential useful legislation that might
remain un-enacted if the fragility of Buckley was kept secret.
Perpetual dissents can serve as a useful signal in another way as
well-when a change in the Court's membership is on the horizon. Repeated criticisms of a controversial constitutional decision by members of
the Court, particularly a four-justice perpetual dissent, will likely signal to
the President and the Senate (and interested lobbying groups) the need to
screen potential new appointment candidates for their views on the controversial question. Some may find this consequence objectionable because,
"[i]t produces, or at least facilitates, a sort of vote-counting approach to
significant rules of law." 145 Others, however, will see virtue in the fact that
the importance of an issue is highlighted when a perpetual dissent exposes
the vulnerability of a precedent. According to this view, Americans have a
right to know if a constitutional holding that will affect their daily lives is in
danger (or shows promise) of changing, and the perpetual dissent serves as
a welcome window into the inner workings of the Court at a time when the
political branches are preparing for a change in the Court's membership.
A third potential justification for a perpetual dissent is that it prevents
subtle tinkering with doctrine and the muddying of the rule of law. If the
votes of perpetual dissenters were not pre-ordained and off the table, authors of majority opinions might bend over backwards to accommodate the
dissenters, resulting in very narrow case-specific holdings with no clear
rules to guide the future. Similarly, the perpetual dissent may offer an outlet
to a frustrated Justice who is fueled by an intense conviction, and who may
142

See Landeii v. Sorreii, 382 F.3d 91, 152 (2d Cir. 2004) (winters, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom.
Randaii v. Sorreii, 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006).
143 Id
144
145

See supra notes 80, 87-88 and accompanying text.
Scalia, supra note 22, at 39.
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otherwise find himself mis-applying precedents (either consciously or subconsciously) in order to avoid the result he thinks is intolerable. A world
with perpetual dissents, some may say, is better than a world where confusing alternative applications mar the Court's doctrines. 146
A final possible justification for perpetual dissents is that they "ke[ep]
the Court in the forefront of the intellectual development of the law." 147 By
virtue of the vast amount of dissenting and concurring opinions on today's
Court, "the Court itself is not just the central organ of legal judgment; it is
the center stage for significant legal debate." 148 And when a public institution is the center of a country's legal dialogue, the debate can reach a wider
audience. Newspapers often report synopses of majority and dissenting
Supreme Court opinions (particularly on the most controversial rulings of
the day). This means that, at least in theory, a rich discussion on legal issues
can take place by everyone's water cooler and not just by the cooler in law
school faculty lounges.
Perpetual dissents do their part to extend this outreach. True, when a
Justice merely cross-references an earlier dissent, he does not add much to
the depth of legal debate. But to the extent the average newspaper reader in
1992 had not encountered then-Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Roe, she
could wrestle with it when the New York Times reported on the Chiefs
dissenting opinion in Casey. Due to their prominence in our society, Supreme Court Justices are able to showcase their intellect to a national audience; this can enrich the debate not just in our classrooms, but our living
rooms as well.
Perhaps the perpetual dissenter-a constant voice in the legal debatehelps evolve arguments and keep them current and in the forefront of public
thought throughout the years. In this way, a perpetual dissenter may enrich
and energize discussion on an issue by adapting his original view to modem
times. A perpetual dissenter on the death penalty, for example, could
strengthen his argument with the revelation of modem innocence cases and
the advent of DNA evidence. If perpetual dissents can significantly extend
and enrich important constitutional conversations, then perhaps they are
worth their cost.
The Flip Side: A Condemnation ofPerpetual Dissents

B.

I do not, however, find the above justifications for perpetual dissent
particularly persuasive. None of those functions-signaling to legislatures,
providing an outlet for frustration, or stimulating discussion-fits the traditional conception of proper judicial responsibilities. Imagine that a circuit
146

See id.

147
148

ld.

/d. (emphasis added).
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court judge perpetually dissented in every death penalty case, reiterating his
view that the death penalty is unconstitutional. Few would argue that this
dissent was a valuable signal to the general populace and the legislative
branches; such an act (although probably not unprecedented) would be considered by most to be obstructive. Although the analogy is not perfectunlike the lower court judge, a Justice is not bound by decisions from a
higher court-perhaps the fact that the Supreme Court Justice is the only
member of the judiciary who has the luxury of perpetually dissenting
should teach us that when she does so she is performing a unique function.
The extent to which one buys these potential values of a perpetual dissent
depends on one's comfort level with viewing the Justices as quasi-political
figures.
When a Justice writes an initial dissent, he is identifying where he
thinks the majority misapplied the law. That is a classic judicial function.
When a Justice votes to overturn a precedent, he is identifying where he
thinks the prior Court misapplied the law and he is identifying a "special
circumstance" justifying the need to abandon precedent. That, too, is a classic judicial function. When, however, a Justice rejects a controlling precedent merely because he dissented from the original decision-an action that
is distinct from his theory on stare decisis 149-he is abandoning the job of
jurist in favor of becoming a theorist. He has diminished his obligation to
apply controlling law simply because he was not part of the Court that
made it so. At bottom, he is elevating his individual jurisprudence (and perhaps individual legacy?) and denigrating the need for consistency or at least
coherence in the Court's doctrine. To me this is an unacceptable swap.
The risk is that perpetual dissents are used not to benefit the law or the
Court as an institution, but rather to promote consistency for the Justices as
individuals. On this theory, the Justices do not want to appear intellectually
inconsistent (nor do they want their colleagues to point out these inconsistencies as signs of weakness), 150 so they write separately and engage in a
sort of "self stare decisis." They cite their own past dissents as authority, 151
and they feel the need to justify why their dissent in one case is consistent
with their vote in another. 152 It is worth asking, however, whether an alle149 See sources cited supra note 5; see also supra Part Ill.
I 50 See, e.g., McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 326 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I dissented in Austin and continue to believe that the case represents
an indefensible departure from our tradition of free and robust debate. Two of my colleagues joined the
dissent, including a Member oftoday's majority." (citation omitted)).
15l See, e.g., Am. Trucking Ass'n v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 545 U.S. 429, 439 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The negative Commerce Clause has no basis in the text of the Constitution, makes
little sense, and has proved virtually unworkable in application . ..."(quoting Camps Newfound/ Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564,610 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting))).
152 See, e.g. , United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 479 (2003) (Ginsburg,
J., concurring) ("I join the Court's opinion, satisfied that it is not inconsistent with the opinion I wrote
for the Court in United States v. Navajo Nation." (citation omitted)); James B. Beam Distilling Co. v.
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giance to "self stare decisis" is legitimate. Should concern with the consistency of one's own voice be part of a judge's calculus when he decides a
case?
Recall that when five Justices of the Supreme Court make a decision,
they do not simply announce "the majority opinion"; rather, they announce
an "Opinion for the Court." 153 And, when the modem Justices hearken back
to the words of Chief Justice John Marshall, they use the word "we" to describe the earlier holdings. Relatedly, when a Justice speaks in his capacity
as a Circuit Justice (say, in deciding whether to stay a lower court decision
pending action on a cert petition) all Justices agree that the chambers decision must be based on the Court's precedents, and not on the views of the
individual Justice. 154 Even if a Justice agrees fully with the petitioner's argument, he cannot use his power as an individual Justice to stay an action
simply because the cert petition appeals to his prior dissenting views;
rather, he must vote based "on a clear-eyed estimate of the chances that four
votes will be cast to grant review." 155 It is the Court's voice, in other
words-and not the Justice's-that must carry the day.
These linguistic distinctions reinforce the idea that the Court (capital
C) represents a voice that transcends time and the differences of opinion
among its various members. 156 A regular dissent has a role in forming that
one voice-majority opinions are often shaped and sharpened by responding to dissenting points of views. But a perpetual dissent-the act of writing
separately solely because you did not join the first decision and want to
remain consistent-is an emphasis of the "I" over the "We."
To be clear, it is certainly legitimate for a Justice to vote to overrule a
past precedent. Depending on one's view of stare decisis, this can happen
frequently or infrequently. The point here is only that there is no reason for
that decision to factor in one's individual track record on an issue. And
when a Justice sticks to his guns on some issues when he has acquiesced to
Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 545 (1991) (White, J., concurring) ("Nothing in the above, however, is meant to
suggest that I retreat from those opinions filed in this Court which I wrote or joined holding or recognizing that in proper cases a new rule announced by the Court will not be applied retroactively even to the
parties before the Court."); Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 153-54 (1991) (Blackman, J., concurring)
("I concur in the judgment. I write separately because I was among those who dissented in Taylor v.
Illinois, where the Court's majority rejected the argument that the Sixth Amendment prohibits the preclusion of otherwise admissible evidence as a sanction for the violation of a reciprocal-discovery rule."
(citation omitted)).
I53 In this regard, it is interesting to note that Justice Scalia has observed that when the Court talks
skeptically about an opinion, it refers to the judgment as one of "the majority" rather than the judgment
of the Court. Martinez v. Court of Appeals for Cal., 528 U.S. 152, 165 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring).
154 Kelman, supra note 6, at 271.
I55 /d. (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Superior Court., 448 U.S. 1343 (1980) (chambers opinion)).
156 For a similar observation, see Stack, supra note 8, at 2240 ("The presence of a dissenting Justice demonstrates that behind the word 'Court' in the 'opinion of the Court' sit individual Justices, with
only the fact that they constitute a majority of the Court's membership separating them from their
predecessors who filed seriatim opinions.").
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stare decisis in the past, this indicates that he is disregarding precedent, at
least in part, because he lost the fight the first time around. In my opinion,
this presents an example of political behavior. No longer is a Justice applying and interpreting the law by looking to precedent, original intent, text, or
public policy. Instead he has traded in that job for the chance to remain on
record and constant as to what he thinks the law should be. That choice may
be valuable, but it is also not traditionally judicial.
The opposite, of course, is also true. Few would agree that a new Justice may ignore all precedent up to his first day on the job simply because
he was not involved the first time the issue was decided. Theories on stare
decisis should not alter depending on whether one voted in the case the first
time. To the extent they do, this is non-judicial behavior; for what legal
principle does a Justice apply when he refuses to apply a precedent (either
in a perpetual dissent or as a new justice) not because it is out-dated or demonstrably wrong, but simply because he was not part of the original majority who decided it? The "that was not me so I am not bound by it" mentality has no place, in my opinion, on the Federal Bench.

***
Even if I am right, however, in my condemnation of perpetual dissents, there still exists a question of significance. If one takes as a given that
perpetual dissents are political acts, why should it matter? To answer this
question-and before rendering a verdict on the practice-it is worth considering the adverse consequences that flow from the perpetual dissent.
First, perpetual dissents pose a problem even for the cynics who believe that the Justices are just political actors primarily interested in imposing their own normative views and beliefs on the rest of society. To the
extent you believe this is true, several scholars have invoked game theory to
suggest that the Justices are more likely to accomplish their goals if they
adhere to stare decisis in the face of decisions they do not like. 157
Under this theory, when the Justices' normative views differ and one
side refuses to adhere to a majority of the Court's adoption of the other
side, they become trapped in a prisoner's dilemma. The most vivid example
in recent history, as Neil Siegl has pointed out, is in the context of the sovereign immunity cases. 158 Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer
refuse to join an opinion that applies Seminole Tribe. They justify themselves by complaining that the Seminole Tribe majority itself belittled the
importance of stare decisis by abandoning the precedent of Union Gas. 159
Of course, if the Seminole Tribe case is ever overruled, then the new disl5? Erin O'Hara, Social Constraint or Implicit Collusion?: Toward a Game Theoretic Analysis of
Stare Decisis, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 736, 748-49 (1993); see also Siegel, supra note 6, at 1182.
158 See Siegel, supra note 6, at 1182.
159 See, e.g. , Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 97-99 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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senters could refuse to adhere to that new decision because of its disrespectful treatment of Seminole Tribe.
Over time, this practice will start to look like a dog chasing its tail.
Professor Erin O'Hara theorizes that if Justices continue to replace one another's preferences like this, the net result will be that no one is any better
at imposing their normative view on society. 160 She argues that this "nonproductive competition" will only flood the dockets with excess litigation
from parties who have an incentive to be in the majority for the time being. 161 Both Siegel and O'Hara conclude that the ultimate way out of this
cycle is for the Justices to commit to stare decisis and to resist the temptation to "punish" the other side by refusing to adhere to its precedents. The
idea is that "the 'losing' Justice's embrace of the majority's decision [will
be] reciprocated in situations in which the precedential shoe is on the other
foot." 162 On this theory, perpetual dissents, particularly ones that are joined
by a block of four justices, simply add to a growing collective action problem.
Second, the practice of perpetually dissenting can actually influence
how the doctrine of stare decisis is applied. This is so because the Court's
test when deciding whether to overrule a precedent is one that can be influenced by the existence of perpetual dissents. As explained in Casey, which
most scholars agree sets forth the modem stare decisis factors, 163 when the
Court questions whether to overrule a past decision, it asks whether the rule
has prompted "a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the
consequences of overruling." 164 In Casey, the majority concluded that
Americans had structured their lives in reliance on Roe, and this reliance
cautioned against overruling the decision. Indeed, even before Casey,
scholars and judges commented that it is "the reliance element that is one of
the chief inhibitors of judicial overruling." 165 To the extent one believes that
the Court's decisions enter the public consciousness and affect the decisionmaking of the average American, then a perpetual dissent becomes relevant
to the Casey reliance question at least with respect to closely divided decisions. Once the public discovers the fragility of a precedent, (which would
presumably happen if every time it was applied several Justices repeated
their view that it was illegitimate), then the decision's ability to stimulate
reliance decreases.
160 O'Hara, supra note 157, at 744-45.
161 /d. at 743-45.
1 2
6 Kelman, supra note 6, at 239.
163 Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535, 1551-67 (2000); see also Drew C. Ensign, The
Impact of Liberty on Stare Decisis: The Rehnquist Court from Casey to Lawrence, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1137, 1141-42(2006).
164 Planned Parenthood ofSe. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,854-55 (1992).
165 Kelman, supra note 6, at 236.
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This decreased certainty in the law is perhaps a vice of the perpetual
dissent in and of itself, but the problem to which I am referring actually
occurs farther down the road when a future Court evaluates the precedent.
By decreasing the reliance interests on a precedent, a perpetually dissenting
Justice can actually change the stare decisis calculus that the Court applies
on that decision in the future. When the future Court evaluates whether
Americans have come to rely on a precedent, it might consider the precedent's durability as always in doubt. In this way a continued campaign to
erode the public's faith in a precedent can almost sabotage the precedent
from the start. Granted, there is nothing wrong with a short-lived precedent
per se-some think a decision can be so demonstrably wrong it deserves
little stare decisis effect anyway. 166 But there is something mischievous
about the fact that a non-majority of the Court can affect a test that is applied by a majority of the Court in the future.
A third consequence to perpetual dissents is the deprivation of a voice
at Conference, or in the Justices' internal debate. Differing views on the
Court-and dissents in general-have a well-recognized value: they improve the majority opinion by testing its reasoning, pushing its logic, and
spotting objections. 167 As Justice Scalia has explained, "the first draft of a
dissent often causes the majority to refine its opinion, eliminating the more
vulnerable assertions and narrowing the announced legal rule." 168 When a
Justice continues to reject a controlling precedent by simply noting his disagreement without further elaboration, he has withdrawn from the game
and deprived his colleagues of his participation. This move diminishes the
internal conversation among the Justices. The perpetually dissenting Justice
removes himself from the discussion of other secondary issues that might
arise, and weakens the fine-tuning of the Court's doctrine that inevitably
comes incrementally.
The largest consequence of the perpetual dissent, however, is its effect
on the Court's perceived legitimacy. Putting aside what each Justice thinks
individually about when he is or is not bound to follow precedent, it is hard
to deny that the Court as an institution is subjected to an external pressure
to stay consistent over time. 169 Indeed, when critics of the Court speak of
"judicial activism" they are, at least in part, concerned about Justices departing from precedent and imposing their own will as the new law of the
land. It is common, in other words, to assume that a commitment to prece-

166 See Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1, 23 (2001).
167 See Scalia, supra note 22, at 41 ("The most important internal effect of a system permitting
dissents and concurrences is to improve the majority opinion.").
168 /d.
169 See Hellman, supra note 5, at 1120.
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dent is what insulates the Court from being perceived as a political institution.170
As the Court has explained (most famously in Casey but also elsewhere), 171 the Supreme Court's power and general effectiveness depends on
its public image, and that public image is tarnished if the general populace
believes the Court to be a mere political machine, changing its mind when it
changes its membership. 172 As Justice Frankfurter once argued, "the Court's
authority-possessed of neither the purse nor the sword-ultimately rests
on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction." 173 And, as Justice
Scalia has warned, the Court should not give ammunition to "those cynics
who claim that changes in this Court's jurisprudence are attributable to
changes in the Court's membership . . . and application of the ancient
maxim 'that was then, this is now. "' 174
When a Justice continues to dissent on an issue that is controlled by an
earlier decision, he upsets the conunon perception that the Court is bound
by neutral principles. Maybe some law professors no longer believe in this
story, 175 but the Court seems to think that the average American does, and it
has expressed a keen interest in validating that belief. Indeed, as an example
of this phenomenon, Emery Lee has pointed out that in the 1980s and early
1990s when Presidents Reagan and Bush appointed five new Justices to the
Court, the general public feared that many old precedents (among them Roe
v. Wade) would be overturned and that "the Court would be perceived as
political in overruling precedents under these circumstances." 176 According
to Professor Lee, the Court adapted by requiring a "special justification" to

170 See Emery G. Lee III, Overrn/ing Rhetoric: The Court's New Approach to Stare Decisis in
Constitutional Cases, 33 U. TOL. L. REv. 581, 586-87 (2001).
171 Though Casey represents the most famous example of the Court's awareness that adhering to
stare decisis is important to keep it a legitimate institution in the public eye, it is by no means the only
instance of this sort of discussion. In Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991), for example, Chief
Justice Rehnquist explained for the Court that "stare decisis is the preferred course because it promotes
the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial
decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process." !d. at 827. See
also Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1986) (stating that stare decisis "permits society to
presume that bedrock principles are founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals, and
thereby contributes to the integrity of our constitutional system of government, both in appearance and
in fact.").
172 Hellman, supra note 5, at 1109-11; see also Ensign, supra note 163, at 1160-61.
173 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan has echoed
these sentiments, arguing that strongly supporting the need to adhere to precedent is "the necessity of
maintaining public faith in the judiciary as a source of impersonal and reasoned judgments." Moragne v.
States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970).
174 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 861 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
175 See, e.g., EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 15.
176 Lee, supra note 170, at 587.
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overrule constitutional precedents, thereby protecting itself from the accusation that it was acting "politically." 177
By disregarding precedent simply because he lost the first time around,
a perpetual dissenter reveals the man behind the curtain; he gives credence
to the claim that the Court is just a building where nine viewpoints are periodically counted and tallied. This revelation and resulting public cynicism,
if you believe the Court, chips away at the source of the power for our third
branch of government, and could be cause for alarm.
IV. WHEN SHOULD THEY Do IT? A THEORY FOR PERPETUAL DISSENTS
Renewed statements of disagreement may have their place (as a signaling device or discussion stimulant), and it is possible to reject my view
that perpetual dissents are difficult to reconcile with the traditional judicial
role. Putting that aside, however, it still seems that if the perpetual dissent is
ever justified, it must be subject to some restraint; for it is most difficult to
take advantage of the perpetual dissent's benefits if it is used, as it seems it
is today, almost haphazardly. Thus, the final section of this Essay humbly
offers my thoughts on when perpetual dissents could conceivably be proper
and when they are most certainly not.
My theory is reminiscent of the fable, the "boy who cried wolf," which
cautions us that important messages fall on deaf ears when they are overused. This wisdom applies to the question of when to write a perpetual dissent. As we have seen, reiterated dissents can signal a need for change to
political actors and appeal to a wider audience to increase debate on important legal issues. Regardless of whether a judge should pursue these goals,
at the very least their accomplishment requires a willing audience; and
reaching an audience is much more difficult if the perpetual dissenter is a
"boy who cries wolf." If perpetual dissents are so common that the readers
of Supreme Court opinions just expect them to appear in all cases, then the
opinions will not have much impact. If, however, perpetual dissents on the
Court are rare, then their effect on the audience changes: a signal is sent
indicating the importance of an issue or the need for continued debate or
impending change.
Justice Brennan once offered a window into the intense frustration a
perpetual dissenter might feel. He explained, "when a justice perceives an
interpretation of the [constitutional] text to have departed so far from its
essential meaning, that Justice is bound, by a larger constitutional duty to
the community, to expose the departure and point toward a different
path." 178 Under these circumstances, a perpetual dissent does not simply
offer an alternative analysis (for that could be accomplished without repeti177 /d. at 587-88.
17 8 Brennan, supra note 4, at 437.
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tion); the opinion is actually more like an act of civil disobedience. As Justice Brennan explains, "this type of dissent constitutes a statement by the
judge as an individual: 'Here I draw the line."' 179 A Justice's attempt to say
"Here I draw the line," however, will start to sound disingenuous if he
draws the line in every case.
In this way, the analogy to civil disobedience is helpful. The average
protester (resisting the rule oflaw in a nonviolent way to encourage change)
will only be taken seriously and can only be effective if he carefully selects
his causes and picks his battles. Likening perpetual dissents to a sort of judicial civil disobedience, the same condition must apply. If Justice Stevens,
for example, was known to bow to stare decisis even in the face of decision
he despised, imagine the effect of his statement that "despite my respect for
stare decisis, I am unwilling to accept Seminole Tribe as controlling precedent." Readers would know that his conviction was very deep, and the
Court's sovereign immunity doctrine is particularly troubling. Now, however, we know that Justice Stevens will not abandon his dissent and accept
controlling precedent on a whole host of issues. The same could be said
about Justice Scalia. He does not just draw the line at "devising an abortion
code;" he also rejects precedents and perpetually dissents in the context of
punitive damages, the use of victim impact evidence, Eighth Amendment
restrictions on capital sentencing, First Amendment protection for pornography, campaign finance, and questions involving the statute of limitations
to use when a federal statute is silent. 180 Like the boy who cries wolf, a perpetual dissenter waters down the impact of his message when he "continues
to adhere to his dissents" on a regular basis and on a wide variety of subjects.
Imagine a world, by contrast, where a perpetual dissent is truly extraordinary. When it did occur, such a statement would indeed signal to
potential litigants that the Court's precedent is fragile and that experimentation on the margins would be welcome; it would really raise the awareness
of Presidents and Senators and the public that the Court could change
course on this topic at any time (otherwise the actors might assume the
threat is empty like Justices Scalia and Thomas in the context of Miranda);
and, it could potentially trigger significant debate because, since rare, the
perpetual dissent itself would become news-worthy. When used that way, a
perpetual dissent suddenly becomes a powerful communication tool. The
benefits of a perpetual dissent would be captured, but, at the same time, the
institutional concerns that accompany them would be minimized: the possibility of nine separate bodies of law seems remote, reliance on the precedents themselves would seem more secure, and the Court's legitimacy
would be re-affirmed more often than it would be eroded.
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If perpetual dissents were only used in extraordinary circumstances,
the Justice who disagrees with a direction taken by the majority has another
open avenue. He can, as Professor Kelman suggested twenty years ago,
"table" the dissenting view until the Court agrees to revisit the question; in
effect, placing his dissent in "temporary cold storage," 181 and even noting
that he is "concurring under compulsion, abiding the time when he may win
over the majority." 182
Indeed, Kelman's "cold storage" option looks a lot like the typical
practice of the second Justice Harlan. Remember that Harlan would generally subordinate his views to the will of the majority, even in the face of
decisions he thought were clearly wrong and had dissented from originally.
Justice Harlan never felt he had to adhere to a constitutional philosophy or
methodology he did not like, and he never felt compelled to extend a decision he thought was erroneous (though once it was extended, even over his
dissent, he would faithfully apply the extension). 183 Thus in no way did he
subordinate his views to the point that he felt he betrayed the duties of his
conscience or a broader duty to the public to call a spade a spade.
I therefore suggest that the Harlan approach is a healthy alternative to
the perpetual dissenter. If the reiterated dissent is ever justified, in my opinion, a Justice should save it for very special occasions and use it only when
he thinks the issue is so exceedingly important, that the country will benefit
from a continuing discussion on it, and/or that some political actors need a
glimpse into the collective mind of the Court to see the fragility of the
precedent. A Justice should, in other words, reserve it for the extraordinary
times when he feels the need to act as a political figure.
CONCLUSION

It is not important that the justices agree on what issues do or do not

justify a perpetual dissent. Nor is it realistic to think that all justices would
agree on one theory of stare decisis. What is important, I submit, is that the
Justices begin to realize the significance of the perpetual dissent independent from their views on stare decisis. When a Justice repeats a dissenting
view in a subsequent case just because he lost the first time around, he isat least arguably-acting politically. Given the potential costs to this strategy, it should not become commonplace. It is, instead, better reserved for
special proclamation-"Here I draw the line, pay attention to this"-and
this proclamation will be heard only if perpetual dissents are not overused.
This self restraint can be accomplished only if the perpetual dissent is
181 Kelman, supra note 6, at 230-31.
182 Jd. at 231 (citing Roger Traynor, Some Open Questions on the Work of State Appellate Courts,
24 U. CHI. L. REV. 211, 219 (1957)).
183 Jd. at 274-75.
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thought of as a powerful communication tool and not as a method to maintain a consistent individual jurisprudence.
· In any event, the perpetual dissent should at least be something we talk
about. As it stands now, the practice has become so common that it is at
risk of becoming legitimized by default. There may be a time and a place
for a perpetual dissent, but it is certainly a topic worth discussing.

